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Summary
In order to avoid too many tied games after playing the five-minute overtime period, the
National Hockey League (NHL) introduced two rule changes in the 1999-2000 season. First,
a team that loses in overtime receives one point instead of zero points. Second, the number of
skaters in overtime is reduced from five to four. The theoretical literature analyzing these rule
changes predicted that they would also produce the unintended side-effect that more games
would reach overtime and recommended that a team that wins in regulation should receive
three points (instead of two) in order to counterbalance the converse effect. We are the first
to empirically support this theoretical prediction using NHL data and data from Swiss ice
hockey, in which the rule changes of the NHL were copied in the 2006-2007 season and in
which the three-point rule was also introduced.
1 Introduction
In the National Hockey League (NHL), North America’s top professional hockey league,
league officials came to the conclusion during the 1990s that too many games were end-
ing in a tie after overtime.1 Based on the assumption that sports fans like to see a winner
after devoting two or three hours to watching a game, the NHL decided to change the
rules prior to the 1999-2000 season in order to maintain and increase the demand for its
product.
Starting with the 1999-2000 season, a team that loses in overtime receives one point
instead of zero points. It was conjectured that the old rule rewarded defensive play
in overtime. Instead of playing offensively and risking a loss (zero points), teams would
prefer to play defensively and secure a tie (one point). By treating ties and overtime losses
symmetrically, the new rule was expected to increase the incentives for offensive play in
overtime. Moreover, the number of skaters in overtime was reduced from five to four
(plus the goal keeper). Removing a skater was likewise expected to promote offense,
* We are grateful to Jason Abrevaya, Leif Brandes, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants
at the University of Zurich for helpful comments. Special thanks go to Christian Wassmer and
Martin Merk for providing us with the data. Sabrina Bu¨ttler provided excellent research assistance.
All remaining errors are our own. This article is based on the second author’s dissertation. Depart-
ment of Business Administration, University of Zurich, Switzerland.
1 See Abrevaya (2004: 293).
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since four-on-four play increases the speed of the game, making defensive strategies more
difficult to implement.
As a result, the rule changes yielded the intended effect, when the percentage of overtime
games ending in a tie fell. However, the rule changes also had a measurable converse
effect2: The percentage of games reaching overtime rose. In order to mitigate this con-
verse effect, alternatives to the rule changes implemented in the NHL have been proposed
in the literature: Awarding three points for a win in the regulation time, the use of four-
on-four play for a longer overtime period (e. g., from now 5 minutes to 10 minutes), and
the introduction of a shootout after an undecided overtime have all been suggested. Most
attention was given to the introduction of the three-point rule. Abrevaya (2004), Longley
and Sankaran (2007), and Banerjee et al. (2007) all remark that awarding three points to
the winner of a game after the 60minutes of the regulation time would reduce the portion
of games reaching overtime. Whereas Abrevaya’s study solely suggests the three-point
rule as a possible alternative, the latter two studies support their conclusions with their
respective theoretical models.
At the simplest level, the intuition leading to fewer overtime games through the intro-
duction of the three-point rule can be stated as follows: By awarding three points to the
winner for a game decided in the regulation time, the rule change simply increases the
total available payoff from two to three points. The larger ‘pie’ transforms a win in the
regulation time into a more desirable outcome.3
No empirical evidence is available at the time, since the NHL did not introduce the three-
point rule. However, the Swiss Ice Hockey National League (Swiss NL) went through a
major rule change prior to the 2006-2007 season, which included the introduction of the
three-point rule. Compared to the rules that the NHL introduced in the 1999-2000 and
2005-2006 seasons, the rules that the Swiss NL introduced in the 2006-2007 season are
different only in terms of the three-point rule. It follows that, by defining adequately
observed pre-change periods and post-change periods for the NHL and the Swiss
NL, the only remaining difference concerning the point-awarding system between the
two can be reduced to the three-point rule.
Although supportive theoretical models are presented in the literature, the question
whether the three-point rule really mitigates the converse effect finally remains an em-
pirical one. We are able to provide the first empirical support for the theoretical predic-
tions made in the literature concerning the effect of the three-point rule. It seems that the
three-point rule contributes to damp the converse effect that more games reach overtime.
Matched data from both leagues’ regular seasons allow us to empirically compare and
examine the two incentive schemes and to draw our conclusions.
One point requires more consideration: the objective function of the league. Abrevaya
(2004) discusses the objective functions of the different agents and states that more
games reaching the overtime do not have to be a bad state for the league. In this sense,
we do not know whether the indicated converse effect is really unintended from the per-
spective of the NHL. Independent of whether the effect was intended, the focus of this
work lies in the analysis of the reasons for the behavior of the teams after the rule changes
2 Abrevaya (2004) calls this effect ‘unintended’, Banerjee et al. (2007) call it ‘perverse’. Although
these normative conjectures might be true, we do not know precisely which goals the league in-
tended to reach with the rule changes. We call the effect ‘converse’.
3 See Abrevaya (2004: 296).
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in the respective leagues andwhether the theoretical predictions about this behavior were
correct or not.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review related studies.
Thereafter, the rule changes in the NHL and the Swiss NL with their basic incentive ef-
fects are briefly explained. We then turn to the data comparison by presenting some
descriptive findings of the different leagues, which we then supplement with the results
of a probit regression analysis controlling for other factors that might influence the
occurrence of an overtime. The final section concludes and reflects on the potential
limitations of our approach.
2 Literature
Abrevaya (2004) was the first to study the incentive effects of the rule changes in the
NHL in 1999.4 He analyzed these effects by identifying different scenarios and payoff
distributions and applying decision theory. As a result, he showed that the rule changes
yielded the intended effect, since the percentage of overtime games ending in a tie fell.
However, the rule changes also had a converse effect: The percentage of overtime games
rose. Longley and Sankaran (2007) proposed a general formal model of strategic behav-
ior for the NHL. They added the insight that the decision to adopt an offensive or a
defensive on-ice strategy crucially depends on a team’s perception of its own strengths
relative to those of its opponent. Their model shows that not all teams find it beneficial to
adopt a defensive playing style during the regulation time after the rule change. However,
they agree that more games reach overtime after the rule change, based on their theore-
tical model. Banerjee et al. (2007) developed a game-theoretic model that determines
optimal team strategies under alternative overtime point-awarding systems for the
NHL. All three publications finally come to the conclusion that awarding three points
to a winner in the regulation time could mitigate the above mentioned converse effect.
However, none of these works present empirical evidence to support the theoretical con-
clusions.
A number of studies have looked at the introduction of the three-point rule in football.
For example, Guedes and Machado (2002) analyze the influence of the three-point rule
on the attractiveness of the Portuguese first football division. While they do not find
evidence that the three-point rule impacted on the proportion of tied games, they support
the more general prediction of Longley and Sankaran (2007) that not all teams will adopt
the same strategy after rule introduction. Inquiring into the German situation Dilger
and Geyer (2009) deliver empirical evidence that the fraction of games ending in a tie
significantly decreased after the introduction of the three-point rule in Germany. After
developing a theoretical model predicting that the proportion of tied games should
decline with the introduction of a three-point rule in football, Moschini (2010) finds
empirical support for this prediction based on data from 35 countries.
Although most of the empirical results from football are in line with the expectation that
the introduction of the three-point rule should reduce the number of tied games,
the relevance of these findings is rather limited for the topic of our study. The reason
is quite obvious: there is no post-regular time stage like an overtime in football!
4 Section 3 explains the relevant changed elements in the NHL in more detail.
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3 The leagues and their changes
The NHL is North America’s major professional ice hockey league. It is divided into two
conferences, each with three divisions. Each division consists of five teams. The points
gained during the regular season determine the standings of the teams. The best eight
teams of each conference according to the respective standings enter the post-season
(the playoffs) and compete with each other to win the Stanley Cup. Our sample period
for the NHL consists of the regular seasons 1997-1998, 1998-1999 and 2005-2006 to
2008-2009.5
The Swiss Ice Hockey National League (Swiss NL) is the major (semi-)professional ice
hockey league in Switzerland. It is divided into National League A (NLA) and National
League B (NLB). There are no conferences within the NLA or the NLB. Whereas the
NLA is the top division of the Swiss NL, the NLB is the minor division, where most
players are semi-professionals. Clubs are allocated between the two divisions at the
end of every season based on sportive merit. Though these divisions are linked through
promotion and relegation at the end of every season, their teams play a completely
independent regular season and playoffs. As in the NHL, the points gained during
the regular season determine the division standings of the teams, and the best eight teams
according to the division standings enter their respective playoffs at the end of the regular
season. The division standings dictate the seeding of teams in the playoffs. Teams com-
pete directly with each other in their division for a slot in the playoffs. Therefore, every
game has the same ex-ante importance for reaching the playoffs. We have match data
from the 2001-2002 through 2008-2009 regular seasons for the NLA and the NLB.
In both leagues, the NHL and the Swiss NL, a regular season game lasts 60 minutes,
divided into three periods of 20 minutes. A five-minute overtime period is played if
regulation time ends in a tie.
The four rule changes addressed in this paper are as follows6:
Element 1: The winner in the regulation time receives three points (instead of two).
Element 2: The winner in overtime receives two points, but the loser receives one point
(instead of zero).
Element 3: The winner in the shootout, which now follows a tied five-minute overtime
period, receives two points and the loser one point.
Element 4: The number of skaters in overtime is reduced from five to four (plus the goal
keeper).
Elements 2 and 4 were introduced by the NHL prior to the 1999-2000 season. Element 3
was introduced by the NHL prior to the 2005-2006 season. Elements 1, 2, 3, and 4 were
introduced by the Swiss NL prior to the 2006-2007 season. Figure 1 depicts the exact
introduction time-line of the rule changes in the NHL and the Swiss NL.
5 The NHL seasons from 1999-2000 to 2003-2004 are not relevant, because during this period the
shootout rule was not implemented (see Figure 1 and explanation below). Additionally, a lock-out
‘spoiled’ the 2004-2005 season.
6 Some other rule modifications were made in both leagues together with the mentioned major
changes. Prominent examples are tightened rules concerning clutching-and-grabbing interference
and smaller goaltender equipment size. Additionally, the two-line pass was legalized in the
NHL, as it already was the case a longer time ago in the Swiss NL.
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Table 1 sums up the different point-awarding systems resulting from the rule changes in
the NHL and the Swiss NL. It is important to notice that both organizations had the same
point-awarding system before their respective rule changes (1999 in the NHL and 2006
in the Swiss NL). After all of these changes (since 2005 in the NHL and since 2006 in the
Swiss NL), both organizations again have the same point-awarding system with one
exception: in the Swiss NL, the winner in the regulation time is awarded three points
instead of two.
The incentive effect of element 1, the three-point rule, is linked to the increase of the total
payoff for a game decided in the regulation time from two to three points. As a result, the
potential ‘pie’ available for the two teams in regulation time and in overtime is identical.
However, in regulation time, this entire ‘pie’ will be awarded to the winner. In terms of
net points (relative to the opponent), a win in regulation time gives the winner three
points to make a difference to his opponent. A win in overtime or after the shootout
Figure 1 Rule changes over time in the NHL and the Swiss NL
Table 1 Point awarding system in the NHL and in the Swiss NL
Old Rules New Rules
NHL (until 1998) & NHL Swiss NL
Points awarded for Swiss NL (until 2005) (since 2005) (since 2006)
Win in regulation time 2 2 3
Defeat in regulation time 0 0 0
Win in overtime 2 2 2
Defeat in overtime 0 1 1
Tie 1 – –
Win in the shootout – 2 2
Defeat in the shootout – 1 1
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only makes a net difference of one point between the winner and the loser. While element
2, the overtime-loss rule, makes losing in overtime more attractive than losing in regu-
lation time, element 1 makes winning in regulation time more desirable than winning in
overtime. According to Longley and Sankaran (2007), it is not beneficial for all teams to
adopt an offensive strategy. The choice of the strategy depends on the team’s own per-
ception of its playing strength relative to the opponent. Teams perceiving themselves as
weak may try to play defensively in order to reach overtime and obtain one ‘secure’
point. However, as the authors show, even with only two points awarded to the winner
during regulation time, teams perceiving themselves as strong may have incentives to
play an offensive style in overtime. These incentives to play offensively in regulation
time may become even more pronounced with the introduction of the three-point
rule. Whereas element 2 tends to encourage defensive strategies in regulation time
for teams perceiving themselves as weak in order to avoid the zero-point payoff, element
1 sets incentives for an even more offensive playing style for teams perceiving themselves
as strong.
Element 2, called the overtime-loss rule, was changed because it was conjectured that the
old rule rewarded defensive play in overtime. Instead of playing offensively and risking a
loss (zero points), teams would prefer to play defensively and secure a tie (one point).7
With the introduction of element 3 ties are no longer possible. One team has to win, and
the realized point difference will now be one point only, regardless of whether the de-
cision is reached during overtime or through a shootout. This smaller point difference
together with the absence of a possible tie is expected to increase the incentives for of-
fensive play in overtime. Removing a skater during the overtime (element 4) is expected
to produce a similar effect, since four-on-four play increases the speed of the game, mak-
ing defensive strategies more difficult to implement.8
The introduction of element 3, the shootout, simply excludes the possibility of two teams
earning one point each. It is clear that one teamwill win and improve its relative position
compared to its opponent in the standings after the shootout. On the one hand, the teams
perceiving themselves as strong should try harder to win the game during overtime as the
shootout decision could be more stochastic. On the other hand, teams perceiving them-
selves as weak compared to the actual opponent during overtime could try to reach the
shootout because their chance of winning could be higher in the more stochastic setting
than in normal play during the overtime.9 This inclination could even be enhanced by the
perception that the weaker team has a high-performing shootout goal keeper or excellent
shooters.
These incentives induced by element 3 may be effective during the regulation time as
well. Strong perceiving teams may reduce the likelihood of an overtime and the possible
‘lucky’ shootout and try harder to play an offensive style in order to win in the regulation
time. Weak perceiving teams instead may already start playing defensively during the
7 See Abrevaya (2004: 295).
8 In the NHL and the Swiss NL, both elements were introduced simultaneously. Abrevaya (2004:
298), examined the effects of the separate introduction of element 2 and 4 in the American Hockey
League (AHL). He figured out that the introduction of the overtime-loss rule as the only changed
element increased the number of games going into overtime in that league.
9 Match data from the NHL combined with the match betting odds show that the probability that the
ex-ante better team wins the shootout is lower than a win during the five minute overtime period.
Albeit this difference is not big, it is an indication that the incentive effects might be effective for the
teams.
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regulation time, hoping for the assured point in the overtime and a possible win in the
overtime or shootout where they may perceive to have more chances to win.
The considerations from above give reason to conclude that the introduction of all four
elements together have the incentive effects the literature predicts: More games will be
decided during the five-minute overtime periodwhile the portion of games reaching over-
time will stay stable.
4 After the changes
The rule changes in the NHL caused the effect that the percentage of overtime games
ending in a tie10 fell from 73.98% in the pre-change period (1997-1998 to 1998-
1999) to 55.91% in the post-change period (2005-2006 to 2008-2009).11 However,
the rule changes also had the discussed converse effect. Namely, the percentage of games
reaching overtime rose from 20.34% to 22.68% after the rule changes.12 After the rule
changes, the percentage of games reaching overtime and ending in a tie after overtime
dropped from 15.05% to 12.68%. This decrease would be higher if not counter-ba-
lanced by the described converse effect. The first rows in Table 2 summarize the men-
tioned numbers for the NHL. Despite the fact that we differ in the observation periods,
these numbers are similar to those provided by Abrevaya (2004).
One could argue that the statistic ‘percentage of OT games ending in a tie’ from Table 2 is
superfluous to indicate after the introduction of the shootout as there is always a winner
now. In the pre-shootout era, the statistic ‘percentage of OT games ending in a tie’ was
meaningful, because it showed the league the extent to which it was still not getting its
preferred result - i. e., no ties. Although this argument is true, this statistic is meaningful
here as it is a good measure to compare the effectiveness of the two different point-
awarding schemes on the originally intended effect.
The rule change in the Swiss NL mimics all mentioned rule changes in the NHL and
additionally introduces the three-point rule. Theoretically, element 1 should counter-ba-
lance the effect that more games reach overtime. This is exactly what can be found in the
data of the two divisions of the Swiss NL. Table 2 summarizes the figures for the NLA
and the NLB.13
10 Note that in the post-change period (2005-2006 to 2008-2009) the shootout rule became effective in
the NHL. There are no tied games anymore. But our focus lies on the game status before the shoot-
out. Games ending in a tie after the five-minute overtime play are still possible.
11 The difference is statistically significant with a p-value50.01.
12 The difference is statistically significant with a p-value50.05.
13 The NHL data is available on the NHL’s web page (www.nhl.com). Match data for the NLA and
NLB was provided by Christian Wassmer and Martin Merk (www.hockeystats.ch). One game was
excluded due to missing data in the NLA and no games were excluded in the NLB and NHL for
this statistic. A comment is needed concerning the observed data from the Swiss NL during the
2004-2005 season. Between 30 to 40 NHL players played several games or that whole season
in the Swiss NL due to the NHL lock-out in 2004-2005. Among them, there have been several
who could be considered ‘NHL stars’ (e. g., Joe Thornton, Rick Nash, Martin St. Louis, Danny
Heatley, Daniel Brie`re, Olli Jokinen, Niklas Hagman, Alex Tanguay, Rod Brind’Amour, Jean-Pierre
Dumont). Despite the fact that this situation was uncommon, it has not changed the studied issues.
The stated results and conclusions based on the descriptive statistics and the probit estimations do
not change when season 2004-2005 is excluded from the analysis of the NLA and the NLB.
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In the NLA, the percentage of games reaching overtime insignificantly decreased from
18.65% to 18.63% after the rule change. Therefore, the probability of a game reaching
overtime has not been affected by the rule change. In this sense, the given numbers sup-
port the theoretical predictions that the introduction of the three-point rule let the por-
tion of overtime games be stable. At the same time, the percentage of overtime games
ending in a tie decreased from 69.41% before the rule change to 53.42% afterwards.
This corresponds to a relative decline of more than 23%, which is statistically significant
(with a p-value50.01). There is a significant difference in the probability that an over-
time game would end in a tie before and after the rule change.
Table 2 also shows the percentages of games reaching overtime and games ending in a tie
after overtime for the minor division of the Swiss NL, the NLB, before and after its rule
change. The results are comparable to those in the NLA. The percentage of games reach-
ing overtime after the rule change (2006-2007 to 2008-2009 seasons) slightly rose from
15.62% to 15.86%. However, this change is not statistically significant (with a p-value
of 0.8875). Again, the numbers indicate what the theoretical models predict. The per-
centage of games ending in a tie after overtime shows a strong decline from 62.21% to
47.83% after the rule change in the NLB. This corresponds to a relative decline of more
than 23%. This decline is statistically significant (with a p-value50.05). In the seasons
after the rule change, significantly fewer games were tied after overtime in the NLB.
As Table 2 reveals, the proportion of games reaching overtime is different for all three
observed leagues, before and after the rule changes. This is due to the fact that we observe
three independent leagues with slightly different rules, unequal rink sizes, different teams
and an unequal number of teams. Differences in the proportions of games reaching over-
time seem to be normal under these circumstances. On a more analytical basis, the com-
petitive balance of the leagues can be seen as a major driver of different proportions of
games reaching overtime. The more balanced a league is, the more teams have the pos-
sibility to win the championship.14 In other words, a more balanced league provides a
higher uncertainty of outcome of a game or of the final league standings. The three lea-
gues have different grades of competitive balance. The NHL is a so-called closed league
Table 2 Game statistics for the NHL, the NLA and the NLB





Observed games 2.,173 4.,920
% of games going into OT 20.34% 22.68% +2.34% pt. +11.50%
% of OT games ending in a tie 73.98% 55.91% –18.07% pt. –24.43%
NLA
Observed games 1.,367 864
% of games going into OT 18.65% 18.63% –0.02% pt. –0.11%
% of OT games ending in a tie 69.41% 53.42% –15.99% pt. –23.04%
NLB
Observed games 1.,101 864
% of games going into OT 15.62% 15.86% +0.24% pt. +1.54%
% of OT games ending in a tie 62.21% 47.83% –14.38% pt. –23.12%
14 Additional information about competitive balance can be found in Szymanski (2003).
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with various restrictions aiming to increase the uncertainty of outcome and enhance the
competitive balance within the league (i. e., player draft rules, limited player trading,
revenue sharing).15 In contrast to the NHL, the Swiss NL is an open league with promo-
tion and relegation on sportive merits and without provisions to influence competitive
balance. A more balanced league is expected to have more games reaching overtime as a
more unbalanced league.16 The analysis of competitive balance with the standardized
Herfindahl index of the three leagues indicates that –as expected– the NHL is the
most balanced league whereas the Swiss NLB turns out being the most unbalanced lea-
gue. This fact is reflected in the different respective proportions of overtime games in
Table 2.
5 Probit estimation analysis
So far, we have taken a descriptive look at the percentages of games reaching overtime or
ending in a tie after overtime, conditional on the described rule changes in the NHL and
in the Swiss NL. Importantly, the statistics of the Swiss NL show that the portion of
games reaching overtime has not changed and that more games were decided during
overtime after the rule change. We will now proceed with probit estimations to inves-
tigate whether the rule changes in the NHL and in the Swiss NL have had an influence on
these percentages when controlling for other factors that might affect whether games
reach overtime or the overtime decision. Following our reflections and findings from
above, we expect that the rule change in the Swiss NL should have no influence on
the proportion of games reaching overtime (the main focus of our analysis), while it
should be influential on the portion of games decided in overtime. For the NHL, we
expect the rule change to alter both, the portion of games reaching overtime and the
portion of games decided in overtime.
Model 1 is designed to reflect our main focus of analysis and regresses the percentage of
games reaching overtime on the implementation of the new rules. In Model 2, the over-
time games are analyzed concerning the effects of the implementation of the new rules on
the decision during the overtime.17 We estimate the two models based on the data from
the NHL, the NLA, and the NLB. All variables are explained in Table 3.
The dependent variables of the two models, overtime and otwinner, indicate whether a
game reaches overtime and whether the game is won by a team in overtime, respectively.
Whether the game was played prior to or after the rule change is indicated by another
dummy variable, newrule. According to our expectations, newrule should have a positive
influence inModel 1 for the NHL but no influence for the NLA and the NLB. This means
that the probability of a game reaching overtime should be positively affected by the rule
change in the NHL when controlling for other factors. For the NLA and the NLB, the
probability of a game reaching overtime should be unchanged after the rule change due
to the incentive effects of the three-point rule. InModel 2, we expect a significant positive
influence of newrule on otwinner in all three leagues.
Since we talk about the outcome of a sportive contest, the most obvious factor determin-
ing a game reaching overtime or not is the relative playing strength of the opponents. It
15 See Szymanski (2003) for more detail.
16 See section 6 in Szymanski (2003) for a profound discussion.
17 In this model specification, the games reaching overtime directly represent the population and not a
special sample of all games. Therefore, no problem with sample selection arises.
218 . Egon Franck and Philipp Theiler
seems reasonable to assume that overtime is more likely in a game in which the oppo-
nents have similar playing strengths compared to a game in which there is a clear favorite
and a clear under-dog. In order to model the relative playing strength we include the
variable teamdifference which is the absolute value of the average goal difference of
the whole season of the two opponents.18
To check for the robustness of the estimations results, we perform a similar estimation
but with the variable winprobdiff as the measure for the competing teams’ playing
strengths. The winprobdiff is the absolute value of the difference in the winning prob-
ability of the home and the away team. Betting odds are used due to the feature of in-
hering all relevant information about the quality of the two teams in a game. We derive
the winning probabilities from ex-ante betting odds that have been published for each
game.19 Unfortunately, the betting odds for the first observed NHL season (1997-1998)
and for all seasons in the NLB could not be obtained. Therefore, winprobdiff could not
be calculated for all these games.
As outlined above, we assume that the greater the difference in the teams’ playing
strengths, the smaller the probability that this game reaches overtime. We therefore ex-
pect negative signs for the coefficients of teamdifference and winprobdiff in Model 1 for
all leagues. In Model 2, however, we do not expect any influence of teamdifference or
winprobdiff. The very short period of five minutes, the reduced number of skaters lead-
ing to increased speed of play, and the immediate end of the game in the case of a goal
scored (‘sudden death’) all contribute to the introduction of random effects into the con-
test success function. Coincidence and luck mitigate the importance of relative playing
strength and make the outcome more comparable to the result of a lottery.
The degree of competitive balance of the league in a given season could be a factor in-
fluencing the portion of games reaching overtime. In a more balanced league, more
Table 3 Variable description
Variable Description
overtime 1: game reaches overtime, 0: otherwise (dependent variable)
otwinner 1: a team scores and wins the overtime, 0: otherwise (dependent variable)
newrule 1: seasons after the rule changes, 0: seasons before the rule changes
winprobdiff Indicating the team’s difference in playing strength measured by the absolute
value of the difference between the winning probability of the home team and
the winning probability of the away team.
teamdifference Indicating the team’s difference in playing strength measured by the absolute
value of the difference in the seasonal average goal difference:
j(goals scored by the home team - goals allowed by the home team) –
(goals scored by the away team - goals allowed by the away team)j
matchday Indicates the day in the season the game takes place
indivision 1: opponents belong to the same division in the NHL, 0: otherwise
HHIndex Herfindahl Index to measure the competitive balance of the league in a given
season. A higher index refers to a greater imbalance. HHNHL, HHNLA and
HHNLB stand for the index of the respective league.
18 This measure has already been proposed by Abrevaya (2004: 302f).
19 The used odds are extracted from www.betexplorer.com and were transferred into the market’s
‘implicit probabilities’ of the three possible events (win home team, win away team, tie).
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games are assumed to reach overtime. The rule changes might have influenced the
competitive balance and the portion of overtime games may have changed. To check
for this possibility, we control for the competitive balance and include the standardized
Herfindahl index as a measure for the competitive balance in Model 1.20 From the ex-
planations above, we would expect a negative sign for the Herfindahl index in Model 1,
meaning that a higher imbalance leads to less overtimes during the season.21 For Model
2, we do not expect the Herfindahl to be influencing the decision of the overtime due to
the same reasons outlined above for winprobdiff.
Furthermore, matchday controls for a time trend within a season as matches may be
more important when held late in the season. For the NHL, the dummy variable indivi-
sion indicates whether the two opponents belong to the same division. The relative point
difference between the teams of the same division is important for the conference stand-
ings (and therefore for the play-off seeding). Therefore, teams may adopt a different
playing style when playing against a team from the same division compared to a
team from a different division.
We specify the following regression equation for Model 1 for the NHL, the NLA, and
the NLB:
Prðovertimekt ¼ 1jxktÞ ¼ b0 þ b1newrulet þ b2teamdifferencekt
þb3matchdaykt þ b4indivisionkt þ b5HHIndext þ ekt;
where overtimekt ¼ 1 denotes that match k in season t reached overtime. In the second
equation, teamdifference is replaced by winprobdiff and is only performed for the NHL
and the NLA due to missing betting odds for the NLB:
Prðovertimekt ¼ 1jxktÞ ¼ b0 þ b1newrulet þ b2winprobdiffkt
þb3HHIndext þ ekt:
The regression results of Model 1 are shown in Table 4.22 The results are in line with our
expectations. In Model 1 for the NHL, newrule is statistically significant. This indicates
that there is a statistically measurable effect of the rule change on the probability that a
game reaches overtime. This fact holds for the estimation with teamdifference (column 1)
and winbprobdiff (column 4) as an independent variable. For the NLA and the NLB,
there seems to be no statistically significant effect that more games reach overtime after
the rule changes. For all three leagues, the control variables winprobdiff and teamdif-
20 The standardizedHerfindahl index has for example been proposed by Brandes and Franck (2007). It
takes into account changes in the number of teams composing the league and makes the standar-
dized index comparable over time. Indeed, the number of teams changed in all three leagues during
the observed period.
21 The competitive balance may not only be altered due to major rule changes addressed in the paper
but as well by other rule modifications explained in section 3. This further encourages the inclusion
of a competitive balance measure.
22 Regression performed with robust standard errors. Due to missing betting odds data, 1,089matches
in the NHL and 20 matches in the NLAwere excluded for the estimation of Model 1 (see columns 4
and 5). There is the possibility of correlation of outcomes across games due to team or even pair of
team clusters (match opponents). We controlled for this possible correlation with clustered standard
errors (home team and away team cluster and pair of team cluster). Although some inference values
change due to the clustering, they do not alter our main statements.
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ference have the expected negative signs when they are statistically significant. The
HHIndex never is statistically significant.
For Model 2, the following regression equation is specified for the NHL, the NLA, and
the NLB:
Prðotwinnerkt ¼ 1jxktÞ ¼ b0 þ b1newrulet þ b2teamdifferencekt þ b3matchdaykt
þb4indivisionkt þ b5HHIndext þ ekt;
whereas otwinner ¼ 1 denotes that the overtime in match k in season t was decided be-
fore the end. The equation with the betting odds forModel 2 for the NHL andNLA is the
following:
Prðotwinner ¼ 1jxktÞ ¼ b0 þ b1newrulet þ b2winprobdiffkt þ b3HHIndext þ ekt:
The estimations results of Model 2 are shown in Table 5.23 In Model 2, the estimations
for all leagues speak the same language: As newrule is statistically significant, the rule
Table 4 Regression results Model 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
COEFFICIENT NHL NLA NLB NHL-odds NLA-odds
newrule 0.1090** 0.0280 0.0619 0.1080* 0.0252
(0.0316) (0.0075) (0.0148) (0.0313) (0.0067)














Constant -4.3340 0.3475 0.4345 -2.3608 0.4155
Observations 7.,093 2.,231 1.,965 6.,004 2.,211
Wald v2 28.21*** 2.83 15.74*** 5.71 8.13**
log likelihood -3.,719.92 -1.,071.89 -846.48 -3.,174.64 -1.,059.01
Dependent variable: overtime
Marginal effects in parentheses
*** p50.01, ** p50.05, * p50.1
23 Regression performed with robust standard errors. Due to missing betting odds data, 226 overtime
matches in the NHL and 4 overtime matches in the NLAwere excluded for the estimation of Model
2 (see columns 4 and 5). There is the possibility of correlation of outcomes across games due to team
or even pair of team clusters (match opponents). We controlled for this possible correlation with
clustered standard errors (team cluster and pair of team cluster). Although some inference values
change due to the clustering, they do not alter our main statements.
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changes induced a higher probability that a game is decided during the five-minute over-
time period in all three leagues. The variables teamdifference and winprobdiff both are
not statistically significant in Model 2. As we expected, it seems that the relative team
quality does not influence the decision of the five-minute overtime period. Contrary to
our expectation, HHNLB is significant and has a negative sign.
Most importantly, the results of Model 1 andModel 2 support the theoretical predictions
concerning the three-point rule when controlling for other factors. In the two Swiss
leagues where the three-point rule is active together with the other changed elements,
more overtime games get decided without more games reaching overtime. Although
there is as well a smaller fraction of tied overtime games in the NHL after the rule change,
the state without the active three-point rule is flagged by a higher portion of games reach-
ing overtime.
6 Conclusion
The Swiss Ice Hockey National League mimicked the 1999-2000 and 2005-2006 NHL
rule changes prior to the 2006-2007 season with only one exception: the winner in re-
gulation time is awarded three points (instead of two). This ‘Swiss exception’ is in the
catalog of rule changes recommended in the literature in order to reduce the probability
of more games reaching overtime after the introduction of the overtime-loss rule.
Indeed, the theoretical predictions made in previous studies that the three-point rule will
mitigate the original converse effect of more games reaching overtime are empirically
Table 5 Regression results Model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
COEFFICIENT NHL NLA NLB NHL-odds NLA-odds
newrule 0.5455*** 0.3518** 0.5199*** 0.5199*** 0.3460**
(0.1983) (0.1333) (0.2036) (0.1896) (0.1309)














Constant -5.4759 -6.1824 7.5413* -4.9214 -6.2148
Observations 1.,558 416 310 1.,332 412
Wald v2 45.89*** 12.83** 12.28** 23.82*** 13.42***
log likelihood -1.,017.95 -267.221 -206.25 -890.67 -263.92
Dependent Variable: otwinner
Marginal effects in parentheses
*** p50.01, ** p50.05, * p50.1
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supported by our findings. We see our analysis as the first empirical evidence that sup-
ports the theoretical predictions formulated by Abrevaya (2004), Longley and Sankaran
(2007), and Banerjee et al. (2007) concerning the introduction of the three-point rule.
Compared to the setup of the NHL, Swiss ice hockey has many peculiarities reaching
from the system of promotion and relegation, which changes the composition of teams
in the two leagues included in our analysis, to different restrictions concerning foreign
players. We can only transfer the Swiss results to the situation in the NHL if we abstract
from the potential impact of the Swiss peculiarities on the questions analyzed. Future
research will show if this abstraction is justified.
It has to be noticed that our study is restricted to a purely empirical analysis of the prob-
abilities that games reach overtime and get decided in overtime. It therefore abstracts
from the precise microstructure of the incentive effects triggered by the rule changes
as they have been laid out in the strategic and game theoretic models of Longley and
Sankaran (2007) or Banerjee et al. (2007). Despite these limitations, our study provides
the first insightful empirical review for the main theoretical prediction.
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